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HUMAN RIGHTS v. EXTRADITION:
THE SOERING CASE
Stephan Breitenmoser* and Gunter E. Wilms**
A. INTRODUCTION
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms' is widely regarded as the most dynamic
and effective of the various international human rights instruments.
Its impact on the judiciary of the twenty-three Western European
Member States, 2 as well as its pace-setting role for other international
mechanisms for the protection of human rights, 3 has recently been
* Dr. iur., attorney, Basel, Switzerland, currently at the Max Planck Institute for Compara-
tive Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Federal Republic of Germany.
** LL.M. (European University Institute Florence, 1988), Rechtsreferendar at the district
court in Heidelberg and assistant at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law, Heidelberg, Federal Republic of Germany.
1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter "Convention"].
2. Member States include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom. With the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe dismantling the Iron Curtain,
there are negotiations already in progress between the Council of Europe and several Eastern
European States regarding membership of the Council. These states are applying to become
parties to the European Convention on Human Rights as a pre-condition to membership (article
66 of the Convention; articles 3 and 4 of the Statute of the Council of Europe). Thus, unlike
other regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS), the Council of Europe restricts its membership to states commit-
ted to the rule of law and the enjoyment of human rights. See generally T. BUERGENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (Nutshell series 1988); C.C. MORRISON, JR., THE DYNAMICS
OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION SYSTEM (1981); Robert-
son, Council of Europe, 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (Bernhardt ed.
1983).
3. Because the American Convention on Human Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights
were influenced by the European Convention and utilize its language in part, both the American
Court of Human Rights and the Canadian courts repeatedly refer to the European Convention
and the judgments of its Court. See generally T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS, D. SHELTON, PRO-
TECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS, SELECTED PROBLEMS (1982); Frowein, Die
Europaische uind die Amerikanische Menschenrechtskonvention - Ein Vergleich, in 7
EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT 442 (1980); C. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 149-63 (1990); J. KOKOTr, DAS INTERAMERIKANISCHE SYSTEM ZUM
SCHUTZ DER MENSCHENRECHTE (1986) (English summary: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS). With regard to the Canadian Charter, see generally
Cohne & Bagefsky, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Public International Law,
61 CANADIAN L. REV. 265 (1983); Clagdon, The Application of International Human Rights
Law by Canadian Courts, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 727 (1981); Williams, Nationality, Double Jeop-
ardy, Prescription and the Death Sentence as Bases for Refusing Extradition (paper presented at
the International Seminar on Extradition, December 4-9, 1989, organized by the International
Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences in Siracusa, Italy) (soon to be published). See
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confirmed by the unanimous judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights4 in Soering v. United Kingdom. In its judgment deliv-
ered on July 7, 1989,5 the Court held that the United Kingdom would
act in violation of article 3 of the Convention if it extradited the appli-
cant to the United States, since he would there be faced with the possi-
bility of being sentenced to death and experiencing the "death row
phenomenon." Article 3 prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. The Soering judgment and the preceding
report of the European Commission of Human Rights indicate, how-
ever, that other substantive and procedural guarantees in the Euro-
pean Convention may, under certain conditions, present obstacles to
extradition.
The Soering decision is significant because it breaks new ground in
the fields of human rights, extradition law, and the law of treaties, all
of which attract great interest and controversy. In our opinion, how-
ever, the European Commission and Court of Human Rights did not
open a Pandora's box6 by applying human rights to extradition law.
Rather, they continued to develop their own evolutionary jurispru-
dence in the areas of traditional and complex extradition law on the
one hand, and modem concepts of the protection of human rights on
the other. Nevertheless, in dealing with these problems, the Soering
case is a further step in the right direction - moving extradition law
away from (international) criminal law towards public international
law and constitutional law. 7
also H. BANNUM & R. B. LILLICH, MATERIALS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1985).
4. The European Court of Human Rights [hereinafter the Court] is based, together with the
Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, France, and has to be distinguished from the European Court
of Justice of the European Economic Community (EEC), which has its seat in Luxembourg. The
Court is called upon to give judgment in cases in which the European Commission of Human
Rights [hereinafter the Commission] in the first instance has failed to secure a settlement. The
cases are then referred to the Court by either the Commission or any state concerned (articles 47
and 48 of the Convention). The Court consists of a number of judges equal to that of member
states of the Council of Europe (article 38 of the Convention). Like members of the Commission,
the judges enjoy complete independence in the performance of their duties.
5. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in I I EUR. HUM.
RTS. REP. 439 (1989), and in 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989) (hereinafter Soering Case); 16 EUROPAISCHE
GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT 314 (1989) (with observations by D. Blumenwitz). The number of
the case is 1/1989/161/217 - the first two ciphers indicate that it was the first case decided by the
European Court of Human Rights in 1989. The last two numbers show the case's position on the
list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding applica-
tions to the European Commission of Human Rights.
6. See C. Van Den Wyngaert, Applying Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's
Box? (paper presented at the International Seminar on Extradition, December 4-9, 1989, organ-
ized by the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences in Siracusa, Italy)
(soon to be published).
7. See 0. LAGODNY, DIE RECHTSSTELLUNG DES AUSTZULIEFERNDEN IN DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 5 (1987); G. KREPPEL, VERFASSUNGRECHTLICHE GRENZEN
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Since this landmark case will have some accelerating effect on the
future discussion of extradition law and the value of fundamental
human rights in such proceedings, the following analysis should not be
understood as a purely "Eurocentric" way of dealing with these issues.
It should rather stimulate further discussion and multidisciplinary in-
teraction between scholars and practitioners, whether they have a con-
tinental background or a common law background. Moreover, it is
possible that this case will also have some impact on the further dis-
cussion of the death penalty in the United States. 8
DER AUSLIEFERUNG UND AUSWEISUNG UNTER BESONDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DER Aus-
LIEFERUNG BEI DROHENDER TODESSTRAFE (1965). With respect to the European Convention
on Human Rights, see also K. SCHWAIGHOFER, AUSLIEFERUNG UND INTERNATIONALES
STRAFRECHT (1988); Trechsel, Grundrechtschutz bei der internationalen Zusammenarbeit, 14
EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFr 69 (1987).
8. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA (1987) (German ed.: TODESSTRAFE IN DEN USA (1989)); THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982); E. VAN DEN HAAG & J. CONRAD, THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY: A DEBATE (1983); Pascucci, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of
Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129 (1984). See the Supreme Court's initial
attempt to distance itself from the death penalty in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (197 1).
Then, in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Court held that the existing system of
distinguishing those who live from those who die was unconstitutional. Therefore, states with
capital punishment had to elaborate a bifurcated capital trial scheme. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976), the Court approved state efforts and ruled that the death penalty was not, as
such, an unconstitutionally "cruel and unusual punishment." See four recent cases decided in
June, 1989: South Carolina v. Gathers, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989) (for purposes of
imposing the death penalty, defendant's punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibil-
ity and moral guilt; prosecutor engaged in improper argument during sentencing phase when he
read at length from religious tract that victim was carrying and commented on personal qualities
he inferred from victim's possession of religious tract and voter registration card); Murray v.
Giarrantano, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (neither Eighth Amendment nor Due Process
clause requires states to appoint counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking state post-con-
viction relief); Penry v. Lynaugh, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (executing mentally re-
tarded people convicted of capital offenses is not categorically prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment); Stanford v. Kentucky/Wilkens v. Missouri, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989)
(imposition of capital punishment on an individual for a crime committed at 16 or 17 years of age
did not violate evolving standards of decency, and did not constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment). It should be noted, however, that none of these four cases
had been available at the time of the considerations of the European Court of Human Rights on
the Soering case. While constitutional attacks on the death penalty have been unsuccessful since
1976 except under special circumstances (e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(death penalty statutes failed to permit individualized sentencing); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977) (the death penalty was disproportionate to the offense (rape)); Eberheart v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 917 (1977) (disproportionality in the case of kidnapping), the possibility still exists that
the death penalty might be held by a state supreme court to be in violation of a state constitution
(e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628 (1972). See Acker, The Grand Jury and Capital Punish-
ment: Rethinking the Role of an Ancient Institution Under the Modern Jurisprudence of Death,
21 PAC. L.J. 31 (1989); Emanuel, Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdicts and the Death Penalty. An
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 68 N.C. L. REV. 37 (1989); Enzinna & Gill, Capital Punishment
and the Incompetent Procedures for Determining Competency to Be Executed after Ford v.
Wainwright, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 115 (1989); Robinette, Stanford v. Kentucky: Upholding Juve-
nile Capital Punishment-A Confirmation of Society's "Evolving Standards of Decency"?, 92 W.
VA. L. REV. 205 (1989); Semeraro, The Process of Death: Reflections on Capital Punishment
Issues in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 563 (1989).
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B. THE SOERING CASE BEFORE THE STRASBOURG ORGANS
I. Procedure9
The Soering case was decided by the Court on July 7, 1989. The
Commission and the governments of the United Kingdom (U.K.) and
the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) brought it to the Court
according to the proscriptions of article 32, section 1,10 and article
4711 of the Convention. It was initiated by an application from Mr.
Jens Soering, a German national, to the Commission on July 8, 1988
against the United Kingdom. On August 11, 1988, the president de-
cided to indicate to the government of the United Kingdom that, ac-
cording to Rule 36 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure,12 it was
undesirable to extradite Mr. Soering to the U.S. before the Commis-
sion had examined the application. The case was referred to the Court
according to articles 4413 and 4814 as well as the declaration of the
U.K. pursuant to article 4611, whereby it recognized the compulsory
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.
The Commission's request and the two governmental applications
were aimed at obtaining a decision of the Court as to whether or not
the facts of the case gave rise to a breach of the respondent State's
obligations under article 3,16 article 6,17 and article 1318 of the Con-
9. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 1, paras. 1-10.
10. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 32, § 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 240:
If the question is not referred to the Court in accordance with Article 48 of this Convention
within a period of three months from the date of the transmission of the Report to the
Committee of Ministers, the Committee of Ministers shall decide by a majority of two-thirds
of the members entitled to sit on the Committee whether there has been a violation of the
Convention.
11. Id. art. 47 ("The Court may only deal with a case after the Commission has acknowl-
edged the failure of efforts for a friendly settlement and within the period of three months pro-
vided for in Article 32.")
12. "The Commission or ... the President may indicate to the parties any interim measure
the adoption of which seems desirable in the interest of the parties or the proper conduct of the
proceedings before it." 1977 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 11 1277 (W. Ger.).
13. Id. art. 44 ("Only the High Contracting Parties and the Commission shall have the right
to bring a case before the Court.")
14. Id. art. 48 provides:
The following may bring a case before the Court, provided that the High Contracting Par-
ties concerned ... , are subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court ...
(a) The Commission;
(b) a High Contracting Party whose national is alleged to be a victim;
(c) a High Contracting Party which referred the case to the Commission;
(d) a High Contracting Party against which the complaint was lodged."
15. Id. art. 46 (1) ("Any of the High Contracting Parties may at any time declare that it
recognises as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement the jurisdiction of the Court
in all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the present Convention.")
16. Id. art. 3 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment").
[Vol. 11:845
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vention. In accordance with rule 33, section 3(d) 19 of the Rules of the
Court, the applicant stated his desire to take part in the proceedings
pending before the Court. Since the requirements of rule 5020 were
fulfilled, the case was referred to the plenary Court. The President of
the Court granted leave to Amnesty International to submit written
comments (rule 37, section 2).21 The oral proceedings took place on
April 24, 1989.
II. The Relevant Facts of the Case
1. Particular Circumstances of the Case22
a. Factual Background
Mr. Jens Soering was born on August 1, 1966. At the time of the
17. The article states in relevant part:
(3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he
has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require.
Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 35, 36, paras. 112-13.
18. Article 13 provides as follows: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstand-
ing that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
In its report to application 14038/88 adopted on January 19, 1989, the majority of the Com-
mission, contrary to the Court, regarded this provision as being violated since it did not regard
the remedies provided for by U.K. law in respect of the applicant's complaint under article 3 as
being effective, as required by article 13 of the Convention. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A), at 37-39, paras. 116-24; Soering Case, Eur. Comm'n H.R. 28-30, paras. 158-68 (1989) [here-
inafter "Commission Report"].
19. The rule reads in part:
1. On receipt of an application or request, the Registrar shall transmit a copy thereof:
(b) to any Contracting Party mentioned in Article 48 of the Convention;
(c) to the Commission:
(d) to the person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals who lodged the
complaint with the Commission under Article 25 of the Convention.
3. When making the communications provided for in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of
paragraph 1, the Registrar shall invite:
(d) the person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals who lodged the
complaint with the Commission under Article 25 of the Convention to notify him
within two weeks - whether he or it wishes to take part in the proceedings before the
Court; - if so, of the name and address of the person appointed by him or in accord-
ance with Rule 30.
1989 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] II 956, 967 (W. Ger.).
20. It reads: "1. Where a case pending before a Chamber raises one or more serious ques-
tions affecting the interpretation of the Convention, the Chamber may, at any time during the
proceedings, relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the plenary Court." Id. at 974.
21. It reads:
The President may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, invite or grant
leave to any Contracting State which is not a Party to the proceedings to submit written
comments within a time-limit and on issues which he shall specify. He may also extend
such an invitation or grant such leave to any person concerned other than the applicant.
Id. at 969.
22. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 4-7, paras. 18-36; Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A), at 4-8, paras. 11-26.
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judgment, he was detained in an English prison pending extradition to
the United States to face charges of murder in the Commonwealth of
Virginia. The homicides in question were committed in Bedford
County, Virginia, in March, 1985. The victims, William R. Haysom
and his wife, Nancy A. Haysom, were killed by multiple and massive
stab and slash wounds to the neck, throat, and body. In October,
1985, Elizabeth Haysom and the applicant disappeared from Virginia
but were arrested in England in April, 1986 for check fraud.
b. Proceedings by United States' Authorities Leading to the
Extradition Request
During his detention in England, the applicant was interviewed by
a police investigator from the Sheriff's Department of Bedford
County. The investigator reported that the applicant had admitted to
the killing, the motive being Miss Haysom's parents' opposition to the
relationship between his and their daughter. The indictment charged
him with capital murder of his girlfriend's parents and the separate
non-capital murders of each. In August, 1986, the United States gov-
ernment requested the extradition of both the applicant and Miss
Haysom. 23 Subsequently, Elizabeth Haysom was extradited to the
United States and sentenced to ninety years' imprisonment for being
an accessory to murder.
c. Reaction of British authorities
Mr. Soering was arrested subsequent to a warrant issued by a Mag-
istrate at Bow Street Magistrates' Court. The British Embassy in
Washington requested an assurance by the United States authorities
not to impose the death penalty on Mr. Soering if he were extradited
and convicted of the indicated crimes. 24 In response to this request,
the Attorney-General of Bedford County, Virginia, James W. Updike,
Jr., swore an affidavit with regard to the U.K.'s wishes. 25 During the
proceeding before it, the Court was informed that Mr. Updike in-
23. For the wording of the Extradition Treaty, see infra note 33.
24. The request reads:
Because the death penalty has been abolished in Great Britain, the Embassy has been in-
structed to seek assurance, in accordance with the terms of ... the Extradition Treaty, that,
in the event of Mr. Soering being surrendered and being convicted of the crimes for which
he has been indicted ... , the death penalty, if imposed, will not be carried out.
Should it not be possible on constitutional grounds for the United States Government to
give such an assurance, the United Kingdom authorities ask that the United States Govern-
ment undertake to recommend to the appropriate authorities that the death penalty should
not be imposed or, if imposed, should not be executed.
Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 4-5, para. 15.
25. 1 hereby certify that should Jens Soering be convicted of the offense of capital murder
as charged in Bedford County, Virginia ... a representation will be made in the name of the
[Vol. 11:845
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tended to seek the death penalty.26
d. The Federal Republic of Germany's Extradition Request
In an interview with a German prosecutor in December, 1986, the
applicant stated inter alia that he had never had the intention of killing
Mr. and Mrs. Haysom, 27 but that he remembered having inflicted
wounds which must have had something to do with their eventual
deaths. In March, 1987, the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany requested his extradition 28 under the Extradition Treaty of
1872,29 after a local court in Bonn had issued a warrant against the
applicant for the alleged murders. On April 23, 1987, the United
States asked the United Kingdom to give preference to its demand for
extradition. The U.K., however, informed Germany that it intended
to grant the German request subject to "the receipt of satisfactory as-
surance of this matter" (i.e., the death penalty) on May 20, 1987.
e. The Extradition Procedure in the United Kingdom
During the committal proceedings at the Bow Street Magistrates'
Court before the Chief Stipendiary Magistrate on June 16, 1987, the
United States presented evidence supporting its case against Mr. Soer-
ing. 30 On behalf of the applicant, a psychiatric report was presented
which stated that Soering had suffered from a serious "abnormality of
mind" at the time of the offence due to Miss Haysom's influence on
United Kingdom to the judge at the time of sentencing that it is the wish of the United
Kingdom that the death penalty should not be imposed or carried out.
Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 6, para. 20.
Contrary to the submissions of the United Kingdom, the Court did not regard this statement
as being a satisfactory assurance within the meaning of article IV of the 1972 Extradition Treaty
between the United Kingdom and the United States. Id. at 28, 30, para. 93, 98.
26. This approach played an important role in the Court's assessment of the likelihood of a
treatment contrary to article 3 of the Convention. See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A),
at 30, para. 98.
27. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 5. This was one of the four reasons leading
the United Kingdom government to the conclusion that the risk of a death sentence did not
reach the sufficient level of likelihood to raise a question under article 3 of the Convention. Id.
at 28. This argument was rejected by the Court. See infra note 28.
28. Contrary to the opinion of the United Kingdom and the majority of the Commission, the
Court carefully weighed this request in light of the legitimate purpose of extradition in general
against the risk of undergoing treatment awaiting execution of the death penalty, when assessing
a possible breach of article 3. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 34, para. 110. The
Court followed Frowein's dissent in the Commission on this issue. Commission Report, supra
note 18, at 32.
29. Treaty for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals, May 14, 1872, United Kingdom
- Federal Republic of Germany, infra note 42.
30. The evidence adduced referred mainly to the applicant's own admissions; see text supra,
A.l.l.d.
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him. 31 As a result, it precluded his full responsibility for the crime. 32
The Chief Magistrate found the psychiatric evidence to be irrele-
vant for the issue before him and confirmed the detention pending ex-
tradition. Two applications of Mr. Soering to the Divisional Court,
one for a writ of habeas corpus and the other for leave to apply for
judicial review, 33 were refused, although Lord Justice Lloyd agreed
"that the assurance leaves something to be desired."' 34 The House of
Lords rejected the applicant's petition for leave to appeal the Chief
Magistrate's decision.
On August 3, the Secretary of State signed a warrant ordering the
applicant's surrender to the United States' authorities, 35 thereby re-
jecting Mr. Soering's petition to refrain from an extradition order.
From August to November, 1988, Mr. Soering stayed in a prison hos-
pital under the special regime applied to suicide-risk prisoners.
36
2. Relevant domestic law and practice in the United Kingdom
37
a. Criminal law
The penalty for murder in England is life imprisonment, and the
death penalty cannot be imposed. 38 If the killings were committed in a
state of abnormality of mind, substantially impairing responsibility,
the person in question can be convicted of manslaughter. 39 Because
the homicides were acts of foreigners abroad, however, English courts
could not exercise criminal jurisdiction.
31. "Miss Haysom had a stupefying and mesmeric effect on Soering which led to an abnor-
mal psychological state in which he became unable to think rationally..." Soering Case, 161
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 7, para. 21.
32. "In conclusion, it is my opinion that, at the time of the offences, Soering was suffering
from an abnormality of mind which, in this country, would constitute a defence of 'not guilty to
murder but guilty of manslaughter'." Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 7, para. 21.
The Court takes up this argument in the examination of the merits of the case. See id. at 33-34,
paras. 108, 109.
33. This application was based on the submission that no reasonable Secretary of State could
regard the above-mentioned assurance as satisfactory under article IV of the U.K. - U.S. Extradi-
tion Treaty. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1872, United States-United Kingdom, art. 4, 28 U.S.T.
227, 230 T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
34. The Commission and Court share this point of view. See Commission Report, supra note
18, at 20-21, paras. 114-21; Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 29-30, paras. 97, 98.
35. In assessing whether article 3 of the Convention could be applied to this case, the Court
finds that "this decision, albeit as not implemented yet, directly affects him." Soering Case, 161
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 27, para. 92.
36. Psychiatric evidence of March, 1989 attested to his dread of the violence which he ex-
pected to experience in "death row" and the peril of committing suicide. Soering Case, 161 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 8, para. 25.
37. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 7-8, paras. 37-45; Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A), at 9, paras. 27-38.
38. Murder Act (Abolition of the Death Penalty) 1965, ch. 71, sec. 1.
39. Homicide Act, 1957, 5&6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11, sec. 2.
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b. Extradition
Extradition between the United Kingdom and the United States is
governed by the Extradition Treaty of June 8, 1972,40' as amended by
a Supplementary Treaty of June 25, 1982 and an exchange of notes of
August 19-20, 1986.4
1
The extradition arrangements between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United Kingdom are governed by the Treaty of
May 14, 1872 for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals, as
amended on February 23, 1960 and September 25 and 27, 1978.42
These agreements have been incorporated into the law' of the United
Kingdom.
43
After receiving an extradition request, the Secretary of State may,
by order, require a magistrate to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
fugitive criminal.'4 Extradition proceedings include a hearing before a
magistrate45 who must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to
put the accused on trial; a prima facie case must be made out against
him before he can be committed.
46
Section 11 of the Extradition Act provides a possibility for the
committed to challenge committal proceedings by way of application
of habeus corpus with leave to the House of Lords.47 Section 12 of the
40. Article I of the Treaty reads:
Each Contracting Party undertakes to extradite to the other, in the circumstances and sub-
ject to the conditions specified in this Treaty, any person found in its territory who has been
accused or convicted of any offense [specified in the Treaty and including murder], commit-
ted within the jurisdiction of the other Party.
EXTRADITION TREATY, supra note 33, art. 1.
41. All these arrangements have been incorporated in U.K. law. See United States of
America (Extradition) Order 1976, S.I. 1976, No. 2144; United States of America (Extradition
Amendment) Order 1986, S.I. 1986, No. 2020.
42. 1872 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 229 (W. Ger.); as amended Feb. 23, 1960, 1960
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] II 2192 (W. Ger.), and Sept. 27, 1978, 1978 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI]
11 1488 (W. Ger.).
43. See Federal Republic of Germany (Extradition) Order 1960, S.I. 1960, No. 1375; Federal
Republic of Germany (Extradition Amendment) Order 1978, S.I. 1978, No. 1403.
44. Extradition Act 1870, §§ 7, 8.
45. Section 10 of the Extradition Act of 1870 provides that if "such evidence is produced as
(subject to the provisions of this Act) would, according to the law of England, justify the com-
mittal for trial of the prisoner if the crime of which he is accused had been committed in Eng-
land, the ... magistrate shall commit him to prison ......
46. "[T]he proper test for the magistrate to apply [is] whether, if this evidence stood alone at
the trial, a reasonable jury properly directed could accept it and find a verdict of guilty." See
Schtraks v. Government of Israel, 1964 A.C. 556, 580.
47. In its report, the Commission pointed out that, as far as the realm of the Court's exami-
nation is concerned, "it is clear that the courts can only examine the question whether the extra-
dition procedures were properly conducted in accordance with the law of the United Kingdom
and cannot examine the applicant's allegations as to the treatment he would be exposed to in the
United States." Commission Report, supra note 18, at 30, para. 164. It concluded: "This remedy
is not, therefore, an effective remedy for purposes of this provision (i.e., Article 13 of the Conven-
tion)." Id.
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1870 Act provides for the release of a prisoner, if not surrendered, at
the conclusion of such proceedings or within two months of commit-
tal, unless sufficient cause is shown to the contrary. Under section 11
of the 1870 Act, the Secretary of State has the discretion not to sign
the surrender warrant.4 His decision may override those of the
courts. After having exhausted the remedies by way of application for
habeas corpus, every prisoner has the right to petition the Secretary of
State for the aforementioned purpose. The latter is bound to take ac-
count of fresh evidence.49 The prisoner may challenge the Secretary of
State's decision to reject his petition, as well as the decision to sign the
warrant, on the grounds that the Secretary's exercise of discretion is
tainted with illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety.50 Irra-
tionality is determined on the basis of the so-called "Wednesbury prin-
ciples of reasonableness."' t  Applied to the present case, the
"Wednesbury test" would be twofold: first, whether the reliance on the
assurance given by the requesting State is reasonable;5 2 and second,
whether there was a serious risk of inhuman or degrading treatment so
that no reasonable Secretary of State could make a decision to surren-
der the person in question.
5 3
In a case decided by the House of Lords,54 it was pointed out that
the Wednesbury principles require strict scrutiny of a Secretary of
State's decision in a case where the life of the applicant is at risk.
5
Failure to consider the European Convention on Human Rights alone
cannot be the basis for reviewing a Secretary of State's decision. 56 The
courts lack jurisdiction to issue interim injunctions against the Crown
in judicial review proceedings.
57
48. Atkinson v. United States, 1971 A.C. 197.
49. Schtraks v. Government of Israel, 1964 A.C. at 596.
50. Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v. Minister for the Civil Service, 3 All E.R.
935 (C.A. 1984).
51. See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., I K.B. 223 (C.A.
1948).
52. See Lord Justice Lloyd's statement at para. 22 of the Judgement: "... I am far from
being persuaded that such a decision [i.e., the Secretary of State's acceptance of the assurance as
satisfactory] would have been irrational in the Wednesbury sense." Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), at 8, para. 22.
53. This argument was forwarded by the United Kingdom Government. See Soering Case,
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 10-11, para. 35. The Commission maintained the adverse opinion.
Commission Report, supra note 18, at 30, para. 166.
54. Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State, [1987] 1 All E.R. 940.
55. Id. at 952. Lord Bridge stated: "The most fundamental of all human rights is the indi-
vidual's right to life and, when an administrative decision under challenge is said to be one which
may put the applicant's life at risk, the basis of the decision must surely call for the most anxious
scrutiny."
56. Regina v. Secretary of State, ex parte Kirkwood, I W.L.R. 913 (Q.B.D. 1984).
57. Kirkwood Case, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 158 (1984); The Times (London), May 19, 1989.
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Pursuant to article IV of the Extradition Treaty between the
United Kingdom and the United States, 58 it is the Secretary of State's
practice to accept an assurance by the prosecuting authorities that a
representation will be made to the judge at the time of the sentencing.
This represeniation will usually convey that the United Kingdom
wishes that the death penalty neither be imposed nor carried out. 59
Article X of the Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom
and the United States deals with concurrent requests for extradition
with regard to a single person. 60
3. Relevant Domestic Law in the Commonwealth of Virginia
6 1
a. The law relating to murder
Section 18.2-31 of the Virginia Code of 1950 defines eight types of
homicide as capital murder, including the "willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated killing of more than one person as part of the same act or
transaction. '62 Capital murder is punishable as a Class 1 felony, for
which the punishment is "death or imprisonment for life."'63 Murder
which is not "capital murder" is classified as murder in either the firist
The Court stated that notwithstanding the courts' formal lack of jurisprudence in this aspect "...
there is no suggestion that in practice a fugitive would ever be surrendered before his application
to the Divisional Court and any eventual appeal therefrom had been determined." Soering Case,
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 39, para. 123.
58. Article IV reads:
If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the relevant
law of the requesting Party but the relevant law of the requested Party does not provide for
the death penalty in a similar case, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party
gives assurances satisfactory to the requested Party that the death penalty will not be carried
out.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 33, art. 4.
59. See Statement of the former Minister of State at the Home Office, Mr. David Mellor,
Hansar, 10 March 1987, Coll. 955. The United Kingdom reached the conclusion that the assur-
ance received at the very least significantly reduced the risk of a capital sentence either being
imposed or carried out. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 28, para. 93. Nevertheless,
the Attorney General conceded at the public hearing that if Mr. Soering were extradited to the
United States there was "some risk," which was "more than merely negligible," that the death
penalty would be imposed. Id. The Court reached the conclusion that the mere information
concerning the United Kingdom's wishes did not eliminate the risk of the death penalty being
imposed. Id. at 30, para. 98.
60. It provides as follows:
If the extradition of a person is requested concurrently by one of the Contracting Parties and
by another State or States,..., the requested Party shall make its decision, in so far as its
law allows, having regard to all the circumstances, including the provisions in this regard in
any agreements in force between the requested Party and the requesting State, the relative
seriousness and place of commission of the offence.
61. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 9-13, paras. 46-76; Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), at 13-21, paras. 39-70.
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(g) (1950).
63. Id. § 18.2-10(a).
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or second degree.64 First degree murder is punishable as a Class 2
felony, requiring imprisonment for life or not less than twenty years. 65
Murder in the second degree, 66 a Class 3 felony, ispunishable by a
term of five to twenty years.6
7
b. Sentencing procedure
The sentencing procedure in capital murder cases in Virginia is
separate from the determination of guilt. The jury, or judge sitting
without a jury, may hear all relevant evidence of mitigation while evi-
dence of aggravation is limited by statute.68 The death sentence may
be imposed only if the prosecution provides evidence of at least one of
two aggravating circumstances - future dangerousness 69 or vile-
ness. 70 Even if one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances
are proved, the sentencing body still remains free to fix a life sentence
instead of death with regard to the mitigating factors 71 or for reasons
of mercy. 72 The Virginia death penalty statutory scheme and the
death penalty itself have been held to be constitutional.73
64. Inter alia a wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing. Commission Report, supra note
18, at 9, para. 50.
65. Punishment of imprisonment for life or for any term not less than twenty years. VA.
CODE ANN., § 10.2-10(b).
66. Id. § 18.2-32.
67. Id. § 18.2-10(c).
68. Id. § 19.1-264.4.
69. This exists if there is a probability that the defendant would commit "criminal acts of
violence" in the future, thereby constituting a continuing threat to society. Id. § 19.2-264.2.
70. This is assumed when the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu-
man" in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. Id.
The Court reaches the conclusion that, with regard to the case law, see Smith v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); Edmonds v. Com-
monwealth, 229 Va. 303, 329 S.E.2d 807, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 975 (1985) (one neck wound can
satisfy the test, if savagely and methodically inflicted), the 'horrible and brutal circumstances of
the killings' would presumably satisfy the test of "vileness." Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A), at 29, para. 95.
71. They include the following:
(i) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity, or (ii) the capital fel-
ony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance, or (iii) the victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or
consented to the act, or (iv) at the time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity
of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was significantly impaired, or (v) the age of the defendant at the
time of the commission of the capital offense.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B).
72., Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967
(1979).
73. Id.; Tu'rner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1985); Briley v. Bass, 750 F.2d 1238 (4th Cir.
1984); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
972 (1980).
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c. Insanity, mental disorders, and diminished responsibility74
Whereas the law of Virginia does not generally recognize a defense
of diminished capacity, 75 a plea of insanity at the time of the offense is
a bar to conviction. 76 Where no insanity defense is interposed, the
defendant's mental condition is only considered at the guilt stage.
77
d. Appeals in capital cases
78
The Supreme Court of Virginia automatically reviews, normally
within a period of six months, every case in which a capital sentence
has been passed. 79 Since 1977, there has been only one case in which
the Court has reduced a death sentence to life imprisonment. The
prisoner, of course, may apply to the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari
review of the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia. He may then
begin collateral attacks upon the conviction and the sentence in habeas
corpus proceedings in State and Federal courts. At each stage, he may
seek a stay of execution. The average time between trial and execution
in Virginia is six to eight years, the delay being primarily due to the
strategy of convicted prisoners to prolong the appeal proceedings as
much as possible.
e. Authorities involved in the death penalty procedure
80
A Commonwealth's Attorney for each county in Virginia is elected
every four years. 81 He is independent in the discharge of his duty.
8 2
The Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia has an unrestricted
power to "commute capital punishment, '83 but no sentences have
been commuted since the death penalty was reinstated in 1977.
74. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 11-12, paras. 67-73; Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), at 15-16, paras. 49-51.
75. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 324 S.E.2d 682 (1985).
76. See, e.g., Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 70 S.E.2d 284 (1952); Godley v.
Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 249 (1986); Price v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 452, 323 S.E.2d 106
(1984).
77. Le Vasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 304 S.E.2d 644 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1063 (1984); supra note 72.
78. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 11-12, paras. 67-73; Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), at 16, paras. 52-56.
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1 (1950).
80. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 18-19, paras. 58-60..
81. See VA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
82. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-124 (1987).
83. VA. CONST. art. V, § 12.
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f. Legal assistance for appeals 8 4
The United States Supreme Court ruled that neither the Eighth
Amendment nor the Due Process clause requires states to appoint
counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking state post-conviction
relief.85
g. Prison conditions in Mecklenburg Correctional Center
86
The majority of people on "death row" in Virginia are detained in
Mecklenburg Correctional Center, a modem maximum security insti-
tution. The size of a death row inmate's cell is ten feet by 7 1/2 feet.
Prisoners have approximately six to 7 1/2 hours of recreation per
week, which they can spend in the two recreation yards in the death
row area. Inmates are allowed to leave their cells to receive visitors, to
consult the law library, or to attend the prison infirmary. In addition,
death row inmates are given one hour of "out of cell" time in the
morning, which they spend in a common area called "the pod." When
prisoners move around the prison, they are handcuffed with special
shackles around the waist. Routine searches are conducted of the en-
tire institution on a quarterly basis as a security precaution. During
such times, which are called "lockdowns" and last approximately one
week, prisoners are confined to their cells. They may receive medical
care outside of their cells when deemed necessary by medical staff,
and, upon request, they may visit the law library and speak to their
attorneys. Lockdowns may also be ordered on the basis of informa-
tion relating to a planned disturbance, hostage situation, or escape.
A death row prisoner is moved to the "death house" next to the
death chamber fifteen days before he is due to be executed. During
this period, he is under surveillance twenty-four hours a day. He is
isolated and has no light in his cell, whereas the lights outside are
permanently illuminated. A prisoner who utilizes all appeals proce-
dures can be placed in the death house several times.
h. The giving and effect of assurance in relation
to the death penalty 
8 7
In the United States, the competence in matters concerning extra-
84. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 12-13, paras. 74-76. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), at 18, para. 57.
85. Murray v. Giarratano, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2767 (1989) (at the time of the judgment,
this case was still pending).
86. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 13, paras. 77-81; Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A), at 19, paras. 61-68.
87. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 21, para. 69.
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dition lies with the federal, not the state, authorities. In an extradition
case where an offense against state law is concerned, the federal au-
thorities have no legally binding power over the states to provide an
assurance that the death penalty will not be carried out. In a situation
such as Soering, the sentencing judge could consider the representation
made on behalf of the British Government. 88 Additionally, it would
be open for the Governor of Virginia to take into account the wishes of
the British Government.8 9  These options, however, are purely
discretionary.
4. Mutual assistance in criminal matters 90
In the Federal Republic of Germany, American witnesses can ap-
pear voluntarily before a court and the German authorities will pay
their expenses. Furthermore, upon a letter rogatory or a request by a
foreign court, a United States federal court may order a person to give
testimony or a statement for use in a proceeding in a foreign
tribunal.91
5. Relevant law and practice in the Federal
Republic of Germany
92
German criminal law applies to acts committed by German na-
tionals abroad if the act is punishable by the law of the place where the
offense is committed. 9 3 Murder is punishable by life imprisonment.
94
The death penalty has been abolished under the Constitution.95 Under
the terms of the Juvenile Court Act (1953) as amended, 96 the judge
will, under certain conditions, 97 treat the accused as a juvenile and
apply the relevant provisions of the act accordingly. The sentence for
murder in the latter case would be juvenile imprisonment for a maxi-
mum of ten years or, under certain conditions, of indeterminate dura-
tion.98 The maximum sentence for a person as defined by section 1(3)
88. See supra note 25.
89. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
90. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 21, para. 70.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982).
92. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 14, paras. 82-88; Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A), at 21-22, paras. 71-75.
93. STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] § 7(2) (W. Ger.).
94. Id. § 211 (1).
95. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 102 (W. Ger.).
96. The act applies to juveniles (people from fourteen to eighteen years of age) and, under
certain conditions, to adolescents (persons from eighteen to twenty-one years of age); see infra
note 98. See also German Juvenile Court Act § 1(3) (1953).
97. Id. § 105(1).
98. Id. §§ 18, 19, 105(3).
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of the Juvenile Court Act is fifteen years' imprisonment.99
German Criminal law provides' for a "not guilty" defense of ex-
cluded capacity,10° and for the possibility of reduced punishment
where the offender's responsibility was diminished.' 0 ' The German-
United States Extradition Treaty of June 20, 1978,102 in force since
August 29, 1980, contains a provision essentially corresponding to ar-
ticle IV of the United Kingdom-United States Extradtion Treaty.
0 3
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany stated in evi-
dence that it would not have deemed an assurance of the kind given by
the U.S. Government in the present case t°4 to be adequate, and would
have refused extradition.
III. Finding of the Convention Organs as to the Law
First Question: Would the extradition of the applicant to the United
States of America in the circumstances of the present case constitute
treatment contrary to article 3 of the Convention?
1. Opinion of the Commission
0 5
a. Majority Opinion
The applicant complained under article 3 of the Convention that, if
extradited to the United States of America, he would run the risk of
being sentenced to death and thereby being exposed to the "death row
phenomenon" pending the exhaustion of collateral state and federal
appeals. He submitted that the exceptional delay in carrying out the
death penalty in Virginia constitutes inhuman and degrading treat-
ment and punishment contrary to this provision. The respondent
Government contended that the applicant does not, in reality, run this
risk.
i. General Principles 1
0 6
The Commission recalled from its case law that a person's deporta-
tion or extradition may give rise to an issue under article 3 of the
Convention where there are serious reasons to believe that the individ-
99. See id. § 106 (1).
100. STAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] § 20 (W. Ger.).
101. Id. §§ 21, 49(1)-(2).
102. Treaty of Extradition, June 20, 1978, United States - West Germany, 32 U.S.T. 1485,
T.I.A.S. No. 9785.
103. Supra note 58..
104. See supra note 25.
105. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 15-31, paras. 89-170.
106. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 16-19, paras. 94-109.
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ual will be subjected, in the receiving State, to treatment contrary to
that article.10 7 It stressed that the removal of a person will only under
exceptional circumstances give rise to an issue under article 3, and that
the burden lies on the applicant to substantiate his fear that he will be
exposed to treatment or punishment falling under that article. 0 8 Re-
ferring to article 1 of the Convention, t°9 the Commission stated that
the basis of State responsibility in such cases lies in the exposure of a
person, through deportation or extradition, to inhuman or degrading
treatment in another country. It supports its approach by decisions of
national courts 10 and article 3 of the United Nations Convention
Against Torture."'
The Commission defined its task in this context as having to assess
the existence of a serious danger for the person deported or extradited,
or whose deportation or extradition is imminent. The Commission
then clarified the relationship between articles 21 2 and 3 of the Con-
vention. Article 2 of the Convention expressly permits the imposition'
of the death penalty under certain circumstances, whereas the 6th Pro-
tocol to the Convention" 3 -provides for the abolition of the death pen-
alty. The latter has neither been signed nor ratified by the United
Kingdom and thus has, according to the Commission, no relevance
with regard to the United Kingdom's obligations in the present case.
The Commission recalled its statements in the Kirkwood case that,
notwithstanding article 2 of the Convention, the manner and circum-
107. See Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 209 (1983); M. v.
France, 41 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 103 (1984); see also Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 158 (1984).
108. See X. v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Comm. H.R. 48 (1980).
109. Article 1 provides: "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention."
110. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 3, 1982, Tribunal Fediral, 108 AFT 11408, 411; Judgment
of Jan. 16, 1985, Tribunal Fdral, 111 AFT IV 12.
111. Article 3 provides that:
1. No State party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent author-
ities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the
existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass viola-
tions of human rights.
U.N. Doc. A/Res./39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, 198 U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984).
112. Article 2 reads:
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a
crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
113. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T. S. No.
114.
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stances under which the death penalty is implemented could raise an
issue under article 3.114
Next, the Commission reiterated the definition of "inhuman and
degrading treatment" in the meaning of article 3 of the Convention.' 15
With regard to the duty of the Convention organs to provide for an
efficacious protection of the applicant's rights," 6 it concluded that the
anticipatory nature of the applicant's allegation does not bar the claim.
Subsequently, the Commission assessed the risk of the applicant's
exposure to the death penalty.1 17  Notwithstanding the applicant's
claimed mental condition at the moment of the crime,1 18 one could
not, according to the Commission, exclude the possibility that the
death penalty would be imposed for three primary reasons. First, the
applicant has admitted to committing the offense."19 Second, estab-
lishing the circumstances of "vileness" with relation to the manner in
which the homicides were committed would appear to be uncontro-
verted, 120 and third, Virginia law does not recognize an insanity de-
fense. 121 Also, the assurance provided by the Attorney of Bedford
County was not regarded as excluding any risk since the sentencing
judge is not obliged to accept the representations made to him on be-
half of the United Kingdom Government. Additionally, further diplo-
matic representations in the form of an appeal for clemency would not
remove the risk of the applicant being exposed to the death row
phenomenon. 1
22
In a third step, the Commission assessed the severity of treat-
114. The Commission reached this result by reemphasizing the fundamental importance of
article 3 within the Convention, being underlined by its bald and absolute terms, and article 15,
paragraph 2, which excludes any derogation from it. See Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 158 (1984).
115. "The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as deliberately causes
severe suffering, mental or physical. Further, treatment may be said to be degrading if it grossly
humiliates him before others or drives him to act against his will or conscience." Ireland v.
United Kingdom, 19 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTs. 512 (1976).
The Court stressed that:
[I]II treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of
Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on
all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 65 (1978). See Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 4 (1978).
116. See Klass Case, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18 (1978).
117. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 19-21, paras. 110-21.
118. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
119. Supra text, section A.11.l.b.
120. For the case law regarding the definition of "vileness," see supra note 70.
121. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
122. In this context, the Commission referred to its findings in the Kirkwood case, 37 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 158, 188.
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ment.123 In scrutinizing the length of detention on death row, the ma-
jority of the Commission concluded that the length of time spent on
death row did not attain a degree of severity envisaged by article 3 of
the Convention. It based this result on four factors: (a) the contention
that, except for the automatic appeal procedure to the Virginia
Supreme Courts, 24 delays are brought about by the applicant's exer-
cise of the rights of appeal; (b) the fact that these procedures concern-
ing appeal were intended to protect human life and to exclude the
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty; 25 (c) the applicant's oppor-
tunity to challenge the "death row phenomenon" as violating the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and (d) a ma-
jority of the Commission agreed that the applicant's age and mental
condition 126 when the offense was committed would be properly taken
into account under Virginia law by the judge and the jury under sepa-
rate sentencing procedures.1 27 Therefore, no question of inhuman
treatment could arise in this respect.
1 28
In considering the detention conditions in Mecklenburg Correc-
tional Center 29 and the execution procedures in the light of article 3,
the majority concluded that they did not attain a level of severity
which would violate this provision. 130 The Commission conceded that
the conditions on "death row" must be tense and stressful, but re-
garded them as being justified by a higher level of security required for
inmates sentenced to death. Furthermore, regarding execution by
electrocution, the Commission followed the Virginia Supreme Court
in rejecting the argument that electrocution would constitute cruel or
inhuman punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
t31
The majority of the Commission did not regard the applicant's
possible extradition to the Federal Republic of Germany as a factor to
123. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 21-25, paras. 122-43. It emphasized that its task
is to "examine the machinery of justice to which the applicant will be subjected and to establish
whether there are any aggravating factors which might indicate arbitrariness or unreasonableness
in its operation." Id.; Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 158, 189.
124. See supra text accompanying note 79.
125. It quoted in this context its findings in the Kirkwood case: "In these circumstances the
tradition of the rule of law which underlies the principles of the Convention requires painstaking
thoroughness in the examination of any case the effects of which will be so irremediably decisive
for the appellant in question." Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 158, 188
(1984).
126. Cf. supra note 31 and accompanying text.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
128. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 23-24, paras. 131-34.
129. See supra text accompanying note 85.
130. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 24, paras. 135-43.
131. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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be taken into consideration when assessing a possible breach of article
3 of the Convention. 132 It reached this conclusion by defining its task
under article 3 as one of assessing the existence of an objective danger.
Also, article 1 of the Convention1 33 does not allow any distinction for
reasons of nationality.
In its conclusion, the majority of the Commission pointed out that
the delays in the appeal procedure are mainly due to the inmate's own
voluntary action in pursuing state and federal appeals. 134 Further-
more, the death penalty scheme in Virginia has as its fundamental pur-
pose the avoidance of an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty and
protection of the prisoner's right to life. Finally, it repeated its find-
ings concerning the relevance of the applicant's age and mental condi-
tion at the time of the commission of the offense under Virginia law.
1 35
b. Separate Opinions
i. Mr. JA. Frowein - dissenting136
Mr. Frowein regarded the alternative of extraditing the applicant
to the Federal Republic of Germany as being a relevant factor in the
assessment of an alleged violation of article 3. He concluded that this
provision was violated and argued that the extradition of a person to a
country where the death penalty will probably be applied requires a
specific justification if there are other alternatives open, since under
article 2 of the Convention1 37 the death penalty can only be imposed
for the most serious crimes. Otherwise, it must be regarded as inhu-
man punishment. In the present case, he concluded, such a justifica-
tion cannot be found.
Second, Mr. Frowein stated that the applicant could be extradited
to the Federal Republic of Germany, where he could face trial without
the possibility of being sentenced to death, 38 without the United
Kingdom's breaking the U.K.-U.S. Extradition Treaty. Lastly, Mr.
Frowein concluded that a formal assurance not to seek or impose capi-
tal punishment - although envisaged by article IV of the British -
U.S. Extradition Treaty' 39 - was lacking.
132. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 25, paras. 144-50.
133. Article I states: "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of the convention."
134. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 26-27, paras. 151-53.
135. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
136. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 32.
137. For the wording of article 2, see supra note 112.
138. For the relevant provisions of German criminal law, see supra notes 93-95 and accom-
panying text.
139. For the wording of article IV, see supra note 58.
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ii. Mr. S. Trechsel - dissenting 140
Mr. Trechsel took the view that, on the basis of an evaluation of all
the circumstances of the case, the extradition of the applicant to the
United States would constitute a violation of article 3. In reaching this
conclusion, he pointed out that "death row" would require the appli-
cant to live for six to eight years in a stressful and tense environment
under humiliating conditions, exposed to constant uncertainty as to
his fate. He rejected the majority's argument that the delay was
mostly due to the applicant's own initative, since a prisoner could not
reasonably be expected to fail to pursue a remedy which might avoid
or postpone his being killed. Additionally, in Mr. Trechsel's view, the
person being executed after the elapse of the delay, being twenty-six to
twenty-eight years of age, is a different person from the one who com-
mitted the deed at eighteen years of age. Furthermore, Mr. Trechsel
elaborated on the issue of the applicant's diminished responsibility at
the time of committing the act.14' Read together with the lack of any
rule of law preventing the impostion of the death penalty in a case of
diminished responsibility, 142 the punishment by death would, in his
opinion, be disproportionate and unjust, thereby violating article 3 of
the Convention.1 43 Finally, Mr. Trechsel referred to the possibility of
extraditon to the Federal Republic of Germany, a solution which he
felt would still support the legitimate purpose of extradition - the
prevention of crime.
When all of these factors were combined, Mr. Trechsel concluded,
extraditing the applicant to the United States would constitute inhu-
man treatment contrary to article 3.
iii. Mr. H. Danelius, joined by Mr. G. Jorundsson and
Mr. H. Vandenberghe - dissenting
Whereas these members of the Commission agreed largely with the
majority's opinion,' 45 they concluded that the applicant's young age
would violate article 3 if he were extradited to the United States. In
Mr. Danelius' opinion, the crucial factor which made the present case
140. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 33-35.
141. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
142. For the provisions of Virginia Law concerning this questioh, see supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
143. In this context, he referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in
the Weeks Case, 114 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 25 (1987).
144. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 35.
145. With respect to the applicant's risk of being sientenced to death; the relation between
article 2 and 3 of the Convention and the irrelevance of his possible extradition to the Federal
Republic of Germany, see supra notes 114, 132 and accompanying text.
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distinguishable from the similar Kirkwood case 146 was the applicant's
young age and his mental condition when the offense was committed.
Although article 2 of the Convention does not delineate an age limit,
contrary to the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights1 47 and the American Convention on Human Rights, 148 the dis-
senting members explained this difference as stemming from the later
adoption 149 of those agreements, rather than by disagreement on the
substantive issue. This, together with the applicant's abnormality of
mind at the time of the crime, lead to the conclusion that extradition
to the United States would infringe upon article 3.
iv. Mr. J. C Soyer and Mr. A. Wetzel - concurring50
Mr. Soyer and Mr. Wetzel denied that the applicant ran a risk of
being sentenced to death. Even if he did, they argued, article 3 would
not be violated. The death penalty scheme in Virginia, and also on the
federal level, complied with the requirements and the provisons of the
Convention, and in particular with article 2. In addition, the delay
leading to the death row phenomenon is primarily based on the in-
mate's own initiative. Furthermore, these concurring members op-
posed what they regarded as an unreasonable effect of such an
interpretation of the Convention, since it would lead to the under-
sirable effect of excluding the impostion of the death sentence in a
State not party to the Convention, whereas the latter itself expressly
allowed capital punishment. Conclusively, they stated that the condi-
tions on death row, severe though they are, were to be regarded as
being proportional to the crimes committed.
v. Mrs. J. Liddy - concurring15 1
Mrs. Liddy focused on the question whether the risk of severe
treatment was serious. With respect to the assurance received by the
United Kingdom from the United States Government and its evalua-
tion by the respondent State's Government, she concluded that no
such risk would arise.
146. See supra note 107.
147. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 6, para. 5,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175.
148. O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser.K/XVI/I.I, art. 4, § 5 Document 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2,
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37(a), 44 U.N.
GAOR, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989).
149. The Covenant was adopted in 1966, the American Convention in 1969, and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights in 1950.
150. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 38.
151. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 39.
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2. Opinion of the Court
a. Majority Opinion 152
i. Applicability of article 3 in cases of extradition
The Court first stated that the decision by a Contracting State to
extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under article 3 where
substantial grounds have been shown that the person concerned, if ex-
tradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country under
such circumstances, the extraditing state would incur responsibility.
The court also pointed out that article 1 of the Convention does
not extend the scope of the Convention beyond the jurisdiction of the
States which have adopted it. Furthermore, the Court stated the bene-
ficial purpose of extradition should be taken into consideration when
the ambit of the Convention, and of article 3 in particular, are to be
determined. The Court recalled the character of the Convention as an
instrument for the protection of human beings, thus requiring an inter-
pretation of its provisions which makes its safeguards practical and
effective.1 53 Referring to the importance of the rights protected by ar-
ticle 3,154 it found that this provision contains an inherent obligation
not to extradite a person to a country where he would be faced with a
real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment, or punish-
ment proscribed by 'that article.
Although it is normally not for the Convention institutions to pro-
nounce on potential violations of the Convention, the irreparable na-
ture of the accused's potential risk in a case where a violation of article
3 is at stake requires such steps to be taken.
1 55
The Court also assessed the degree of the risk of Mr. Soering being
sentenced to death and exposed to the death row phenomenon. It.
reached the conclusion that, notwithstanding the possible applicability
of four of the five facts in mitigation expressly mentioned in the Code
of Virginia'5 6 and the "assurance" obtained by the Commonwealth's
152. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 24-35, paras. 81-111.
153. It recalled its findings in Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) 90
(1978), as well as in the Artico Case, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 16 (1980), and the Kjeldsen, Busk
Madsen & Pedersen Case, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 27 (1976).
154. In this context, the Court cited the United Nations Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 111, as well as article
7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 147, and article 5,
section 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 148, which contain provi-
sions similar to article 3 of the Convention.
155. The Court stressed the requirement of an effective protection of the rights safeguarded
by this provision.
156. See supra note 71.
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Attorney, 57 the risk was significant. The Court referred to the brutal
circumstances of the killings'58 which presumably would be sufficient
to establish the "vileness" of the crime,15 9 and the firm stance the na-
tional authority took with regard to the prosecution of Mr. Soering.1
60
Another crucial factor in this context was the absence of any direction
which could be given to the Commonwealth's Attorney.
ii. The risk of exposure to the "death row phenomenon" as a
breach of article 3
In clarifying the relation between articles 2 and 3 of the Conven-
tion, the Court reached the same conclusion as the Commission.'
6'
With regard to the 6th Protocol of the Convention, ' 62the Court
stressed that the intention of the Contracting Parties in 1983 was not
to create a new automatic obligation for all Contracting Parties to the
Convention, i.e., to abolish the death penalty. Rather, the Parties in-
tended to allow each State to choose the moment when such action
should be undertaken.
The Court concluded by stating that the manner in which the
death penalty is imposed or executed, the personal circumstances of
the condemned person, a disproportionality to the gravity of the crime
committed, as well as the conditions of detention awaiting execution,
are all factors to be considered when assessing a possible infringement
upon article 3.
With regard to the length of detention awaiting execution, 63 the
majority of the court conceded that the remedies available in Vir-
ginia' 64 would ensure that the ultimate sanction would not be imposed
unlawfully or arbitrarily. Notwithstanding the well-intentioned char-
acter of these appeal procedures, however, the result is the condemned
person's exposure to the conditions on death row for many years, and
to the mounting tension of living "in the ever-present shadow of
death." ' 6  As to the conditions on death row, 16 6 the Court found
157. See supra note 25. The Court stated: ". . . objectively it cannot be said that the under-
taking to inform the judge at the sentencing stage of the wishes of the United Kingdom elimi-
nates the risk of the death penalty being imposed." Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at
30, para. 98.
158. See supra text, section A. I.I.
159. For the definition and the relevant case law, see supra note 70.
160. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 114.
162. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 114.
164. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
165. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 33, para. 106.
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them severe, especially the protracted period to which the inmates are
subjected.
The applicant's age and mental condition at the time of the deed
were also considered relevant factors under article 3. Although Vir-
ginia law recognizes these factors, and serves to prevent arbitrary deci-
sions, these considerations do not, according to the majority of the
Court, outweigh the relevance of the two factors mentioned.
Contrary to the majority of the Commission, 167 the Court weighed
the argument of the applicant's possible extradition and trial in the
Federal Republic of Germany in light of article 3, since this possibility
would serve the legitimate purpose of extradition, and avoid the risk of
the applicant's exposure to the death row phenomenon. Accordingly,
it constituted an important element in the Court's assessment of
whether the extradition procedure was to be considered
"proportional."
Acknowledging the positive features of the Virginia death penalty
scheme, the Court conclusively stated that the above-mentioned fac-
tors would give rise to a breach of article 3 if the applicant was to be
extradited to the United States.
b. Judge De Meyer - concurring 1
68
Judge De Meyer did not only regard the applicant's possible extra-
dition as a violation of article 3 of the Convention, but argued that it
would violate his right to life. According to De Meyer, no requested
State can be entitled to allow a requesting State to do what the re-
quested State itself is not allowed to do. The United Kingdom would
be precluded from extraditing the applicant to the United States, since
the former has abolished the death penalty whereas the latter has not.
Secondly, the fact that no European States extradite fugitives under
similar circumstances should mean, in De Mayer's opinion, that such
a practice would be repugnant to European standards of justice, and
thereby contrary to the public order of Europe.
169
No absolute assurance to refrain from imposing capital punish-
ment could be made. Hence, the applicant's extradition to the United
States would violate his right to life.
166. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 132; see also Frowein's dissent, supra note 136 and accompanying text.
168. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 41.
169. Judge De Meyer refers to the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights and to the decision of the
French Conseil d'Etat in the Fidan Case, 1987 Recueil Dalloz Sirey [D.S. Jur.] 305.
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Second Question: Would the extradition of the applicant constitute
a breach of article 6, paragraph 3(c) of the Convention due to the ab-
sence of legal aid in the State of Virginia to pursue various State and
Federal appeals?
1. Opinion of the Commission
a. Majority opinion1
70
The applicant claimed that the absence of legal aid under Virginia
law to fund collateral state and federal appeals would violate article 6,
section 3(c) of the Convention.
The Commission held unanimously that this was an issue entirely
within the United States' jurisdiction and therefore not within the re-
sponsibility of the United Kingdom.
b. Mr. Trechsel - concurring'I7
Mr. Trechsel pointed out that a question under article 6 could be
raised in an extradition case if the proceedings in the requesting State
were to be considered as unfair. Since this had not been shown in the
present case, he concurred with the majority.
2. Opinion of the Court172
The Court reached the same conclusion as Mr. Trechsel in his con-
curring opinion. 73 The applicant's complaint under article 6 regard-
ing to the extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom 74 was not
part of the Commission's decision on admissibility and hence the
Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
Third Question: Does the applicant have an effective remedy under
the law of the United Kingdom in respect of his complaint under article
3 as required by article 13 of the Convention?
1. Opinion of the Commission 75
At first, the Commission found article 13 of the Convention 176 ap-
170. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 27-28, paras. 155-57.
171. Id. at 35.
172. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 35-37, paras. 112-15.
173. It recalled its statement in the Colozza Case, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 12 (1985), that
the right ot fair trial in criminal proceedings, as embodied in article 6 of the Convention, holds a
prominent place in a democratic society. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 36, para.
113.
174. See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 36, para. 114.
175. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 28-30, paras. 158-68.
176. For the wording of article 13, see supra note 18.
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plicable, because Mr. Soering presented an arguable claim under arti-
cle 3 of the Convention. 177 The Commission denied the effectiveness
of the habeas corpus procedure178 and the judicial review procedure
following the Secretary of State'e extradition order 179 for purposes of
article 13. It maintained the opinion that, in neither of the procedures,
could courts examine the applicant's allegations as to the treatment he
would face in the United States.
The Commission also concluded that the right to petition to the
Secretary of State did not meet the requirements of article 13 for lack
of independence of the Secretary of State.
In conclusion, the Commission found that the aggregation of these
remedies did not cure the imperfection of each of them.
2. Opinion of the Court 80
As to the applicability of article 13, the Court reached the same
result as the Commission. 181 The crucial argument for the Court's
view that no violation of article 13 existed was its conclusion that the
"reasonableness test" applied in English courts'8 2 included - in ex-
tradition cases - a scrutiny of the risk of inhuman or degrading treat-
ment which the extradited person would have to face in the requesting
State. 8
3
Fourth Question: How does article 50 of the Convention apply to the
case at hand? 184
The Court granted the applicant just compensation in terms of full
recovery of his costs and expenses 185 in application of article 50186 of
the Convention.
177. For the requirements under Article 13 set up by the European Court of Human Rights,
see its judgment in Silver and Others, 61 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 42 (1983).
178. See supra note 47.
179. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
180. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 37-39, paras. 116-24.
181. See Boyle and Rice, 131 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23 (1988).
182. See supra note 51.
183. See supra note 53.
184. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 39-40, paras. 125-28.
185. They amounted to £26,752.80 and 5,030.60 French francs, plus any chargeable value-
added tax. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 40.
186. Article 50 reads:
If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other
authority of a High Contracting Party, is completely or partially in conflict with the obliga-
tions arising from the present convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows
only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the
decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
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IV. Sequel to the Judgement
According to a note in the German press, the British Government
ordered Mr. Soering's surrender to the United States after having ob-
tained an assurance from the United States' judicial authorities that
the death penalty would not be imposed.187
C. A DISCUSSION OF THE SOERING CASE
I. The Effectiveness of the Strasbourg Proceedings
Before analyzing the report and judgment of the two Strasbourg
organs, we must emphasize some formal and practical aspects of the
Strasbourg proceedings. First, in the Soering case, the European
Court of Human Rights followed the jurisprudence of the Commission
in extradition cases and showed for the third time 88 in its thirty years
of practice t89 its willingness not only to react after a problem of
187. Frankfurter AlIgemeine Zeitung, Aug. 3, 1989, at 7. However, the press-note did not
give any information on either the wording or the author of the assurance. See Press Communi-
qu6 of the Council of Europe C (90) 42, Mar. 3, 1990, at 2:
The Government of the United Kingdom subsequently gave the Committee of Ministers
the following information about the measures taken in consequence of the Court's judge-
ment:
'The Government of the United Kingdom in a diplomatic note of 28 July 1989 informed
the United States authorities that the extradition of the applicant on charges of capital mur-
der or any other offence the penalty for which may include the imposition of the death
penalty was refused. The applicant would be surrended on the basis that he would not be
proceeded against for any offence other than the two counts of first degree murder including
any lesser offence.
The Authorities of the United States of America confirmed in a diplomatic note of 31
July 1989 that in light of the applicable provisions of the 1972 Extradition treaty, United
State's law would prohibit the applicant's prosecution in Virginia for the offence of capital
murder.'
In Resolution DH (90) 8 of 12 March 1990, the Committee of Ministers declared, after
having taken note of the above-mentioned information, that it had exercised its functions
under Article 34 of the Convention.
Article 54 reads: "The judgment of the court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Minis-
ters which shall supervise its execution."
188. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 24-27, paras. 81-91 (1989). Already in the
cases of secret telephone tapping and the directly affective criminal legislation of homosexuality,
the Strasbourg organs pronounced on the existence of such potential violations of the Conven-
tion: Klass Case, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 34 (1978); Malone Case, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) 18, para. 64 (1984); Norris Case, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 10-13, paras. 28-38 (1988).
Judge Valticos wrote a dissenting opinion in which Judges G6ickli, Matscher, Walsh, Bern-
hardt, and Carillo Salcedo joined. Id. at 19. See V. BERGER, CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 1960-1987, at 100, 257 (1989). With regard to rule 36 of the Com-
mission's Rules of Procedure, see Commission Report, supra note 18, at 1, paras. 3-4. Sudre,
Extradition et Peine de Mort.- Arrift Soering de la Cour Europienne des Draits de I'hornme, 94
Recueil des Cours 103, 105, 111 (1990).
189. After the foundation of the Council of Europe in 1949 and the signature of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights by fifteen European countries, this Convention came into
force on September 3, 1953. The European Commission of Human Rights was created in 1954
and the Right of Individual Petition came into force in 1955. The European Court of Human
Rights was not established before 1959. F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (1975); L. MIKAELSON, EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1980).
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human rights had occurred, but also its competence of jurisdiction in
special categories of cases with imminent risks of infringements upon
the Convention and, therefore, its ability to prevent a violation of
human rights. 190 As the Commission put it, the issue in such extradi-
tion proceedings is of an anticipatory nature and the "conclusion on
the question of whether there is a breach of the Convention must nec-
essarily be a conditional one based on the decision to extradite to the
Unites States."'' 91
Second, the Soering case represented the first occasion in which a
Government not associated with the earlier proceedings before the
Commission had recourse to article 48 (b) of the Convention. Article
48 enables "a High Contracting Party whose national is alleged to be a
victim" of a violation of the Convention to "bring a case before the
Court." 1
92
Third, although the judgments of the European Court - unlike
the judgments of the European Court of Justice of the EEC193 - do
not have a direct effect on municipal law, the British Government was
nevertheless obliged to observe the terms of the decision by the Court
as part of its obligations as a party to the Convention.194 Public opin-
ion and political pressure may also have been a reason why the United
Kingdom abided by the decision. 95 Until now, all 169 judgments of
the European Court have been duly respected.' 96
Fourth, the efficacy of the European Convention on Human Rights
machinery was illustrated in the Soering case by the short time of the
decision-making process: the entire proceedings before the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights were completed in just one
year. 9
7
190. On January 26, 1989, following requests for an interim measure made by the Commis-
sion and the applicant, the Court issued an indication to the Government of the United Kingdom
that it would be advisable not to extradite the applicant pending the outcome of the proceedings
before the Court. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 2, para 4 (1989).
191. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 19, para. 108.
192. See supra note 14. Sudre, supra note 188, at 106.
193., See supra note 4. In contrast to the European Court of Human Rights, the judgments of
the supranational Court of Justice of the EEC are directly applicable and enforceable according
to the municipal law of the concerned member states. Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, opened for signature Mar. 25, 1987, arts. 187-92, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
194. Article 53 provides: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the decision
of the Court in any case to which they are parties."
195. See supra note 187.
196. Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights: Survey of activities 1959-1989
(1990).
197. Mr. Soering's application against the United Kingdom was lodged with the European
Commission of Human Rights on July 8, 1988 and declared admissible on November 10, 1988
(Jens Soering v. United Kingdom, No. 14038/88, Press Communiqu6 C(88) 125, Nov. 16, 1988).
After the adoption of the Commission's report on January 19, 1989, the case was referred to the
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II. The Applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights
to Extradition Proceedings
At first glance, three provisions of the Convention refer to extradi-
tion, expulsion and deportation: 98 article 5, section l(f) of the Con-
vention,199 and article 3, section 1, and article 4 of Protocol IV.2°°
These provisions were not relevant in the Soering case. Secondly, "no
right not to be extradited is as such protected by the Convention."' 20
Thus, both the Commission and the Court started their deliberations
by stating that if an extradition hs adverse consequences on the en-
joyment of Convention rights, it can involve the obligations of a Con-
tracting State under the relevant Convention guarantee provided that
the consequences are not too remote.202
As the case law shows,20 3 this important introductory remark is
not new at all. It implicitly says that every coercive act by an author-
ity in extradition proceedings which will have an effect on the ex-
traditee204 can be considered a serious interference with the
Court by the Commission on January 25, 1989 by the Government of the United Kingdom on
January 30, 1989 and by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on February 3,
1989. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 1, para. I. On July 7, 1989, the Court deliv-
ered its judgment. Sudre, supra note 188, at 105.
198. For the purposes of this article, these notions and legal institutions can be discussed
without distinction. See art. 5, § l(f), infra note 198; P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN HOOF, THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 198, 291-92 (1984);
Frowein & Peukert, Eurpdische Menschenrechts-Komention, EMRK-KOMMENTAR, art. 3, mar-
ginal notes 18-24 (1985); Sudre, supra note 188, at 121. Villiger, Expulsion and the Right to
Respect for Private and Family Life (Article 8 of the Convention) - An Introduction to the Commis-
sion's Case-law, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION, STUDIES IN
HONOUR OF G.J. WIARDA 657 (1988); Vogler, The Scope of Extradition in the Light of the
European Convention on Human Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN Di-
MENSION, STUDIES IN HONOUR OF J. WIARDA 663 (1988).
199. Article 5, § l(f) states as follows: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with
a procedure prescribed by law: (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person ... against whom
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition."
200. Article 3, § I provides: "No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or
of a collective measure, from the territory of the State of which he is a national." Article 4
provides: "Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited." The European Court mentioned only
article 5, § I (f). See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A), at 25, para. 85.
201. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 25, para. 85. With regard to the three
above-mentioned provisions, it is not quite correct to say that "(t)he Convention does not contain
any provision explicitly limiting the scope of extradition." Vogler, supra note 198, at 663.
202. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 25, para. 85; Commission Report, supra
note 18, at 16, para. 94.
203. The Court referred to the Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkandali Case, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) 24, paras. 59-60 (1985), in relation to rights in the field of immigration; i.e., article 8 of the
Convention. See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A), at 25, para. 85. The Commission
referred to its decisions Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 209
(1983), M. v. France, 41 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 103 (1984), and Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 37
Eur. Comm'n H.R. 158 (1984). See Commission Report, supra note 18, at 16, para. 94.
204. For example, the (provisional) detention or other coercive measures of mutual judicial
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fundamental and human rights of the person extradited. Thus, the
Commission in the Kirkwood case held that:
although extradition and the right of asylum are not, as such, among the
matters governed by the Convention... the Contracting States have nev-
ertheless accepted to restrict the free exercise of their powers under gen-
eral and international law, including the power to control the entry and
exit of aliens, to the extent and within the limits of the obligations which
they have assumed under the Convention. 20 5
The recognition of extradition as an interference with fundamental
and human rights has nothing to do with including new rights in the
European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore, the same princi-
ple applies with regard to other (coercive) measures taken by a public
authority with "consequences adversely affecting the enjoyment of a
Convention right.' '20 6 For instance, even though there is no right to
reside in a particular country guaranteed by the Convention, 20 7 an ex-
pulsion or extradition order might infringe upon the right to respect
for family life.208 Consequently, any interference with the exercise of
that right must be in accordance with the law and "necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.' ' 2° 9 Therefore, in our opinion,
assistance, such as interrogation of witnesses or seizure of objects, and, of course, the surrender
itself.
205. Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 158, 183 (1984) (quoting X v.
Austria & Yugoslavia, 1964 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUM. RTs. 314, 328).
206. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 25, para. 85.
207. Family X v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 232, 234 (1982), with further
references.
208. For instance, article 8 was violated in a case where a Moroccan national was expelled
from the Netherlands after his divorce from his Dutch wife (breach of the applicants' right to
respect for family life and of the parental rights of the expelled). The refusal of a residence
permit and the resulting expulsion was considered by the Strasbourg organs as preventing the
applicants from maintaining regular contact with each other, although such contacts were essen-
tial as the child was very young. With regard to the particular circumstances, the Court consid-
ered "that a proper balance was notachieved between the interests involved and that there was
therefore a disproportion between the means employed and the legitimate aim pursued." Ber-
rehab v. Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 29 (1988). In a new application declared
admissible by the Commission, a Moroccan national who was deported from Belgium after being
sentenced to prison "stresses that all his close relatives (father, mother and their seven other
children) are still in Belgium, that his real mother tongue is French, that he speaks only a few
words of Arabic and that most of the members of his family have acquired Belgian nationality."
M. v. Belgium, Press Communiqu6 of the Council of Europe, DH(89)3, Apr. 12, 1989, at 10-11.
After having found that the expulsion was made purely for security reasons and did not fulfil the
requirement of proportionality the Commission brought this violation of article 8 before the
Court. Press Communiqui of the Council of Europe, B(90)3, Feb. 2, 1990, at 8. See X v. The
Federal Republic of Germany, 27 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 243 (1981). Sudre, supra note 188, at 110-
11.
209. Convention, supra note 1, art. 8, § 2. For further discussion of article 8, see S. Breiten-
moser, Der Schutz der Privatsph"re gemss Art. 8; EMRK: DAs RECHT AUF ACHTUNG DES
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every intrusion into the private sphere, as defined by the jurisprudence
of the Strasbourg organs, which may occur in extradition cases is per
se an interference with this guarantee and must be justified under arti-
cle 8, section 2 of the Convention.
Regarding this theoretical analysis of coercive measures issued by
a public authority as interferences with other rights guaranteed in the
Convention, it is not correct to conclude that "via article 3 certain
rights and freedoms which are not included as such in the Convention
may be brought under its protection, or at any rate the argument that
they are implicitly protected by the Convention may thus be consoli-
dated. ' 2 °10 As we have just seen, not only may article 3 of the Conven-
tion be infringed by extradition, but also article 8211 or, as in the
Soering case, articles 6 and 13. Therefore, neither the Commission nor
the Court should have included and narrowed these preliminary con-
siderations on the applicability of the Convention under the heading of
article 3. Instead, these general problems occurring in deportation or
extradition cases should have been dealt with in preliminary and sepa-
rate legal passages in the Soering case.
III. The Responsibility of the Extraditing State under the European
Convention on Human Rights
According to article 1 of the Convention, "[t]he High Contracting
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention." Like the applicabil-
ity of the Convention in general, this territorial limit on the reach of
the Convention should have been discussed under a separate subhead-
ing at the beginning of the deliberations. 21 2 Given such a formal sepa-
ration from the substantive guarantee of article 3, it would be much
easier to understand that the responsibility of the United Kingdom in
the Soering case was a general one, and had nothing to do with an
extraterritorial application of European moral standards and percep-
tions with regard to the death penalty. Instead, this responsibility
PRIVAT-UND FAMILIENLEBENS, DER WOHNUNG UND DES BRIEFVERKEHRS 112-15 (1986); VAN
DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 198, at 291-93; FROWEIN & PEUKERT, supra note 198, at margi-
nal notes 23-25; VILLIGER, supra note 198, at 657-62.
210. VAN DIK & VAN HOOF, supra note 198, at 298.
211. The European Court itself referred to immigration and thus to article 8 of the Conven-
tion. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 25, para. 85. See supra note 208.
212. The subheading "Applicability of Article 3 in Cases of Extradition" should have been
divided into "Applicability of the Convention in Cases of Extradition" and "Responsibility of the
Respondent Government," and both should have been placed before the heading "Alleged
Breach of Article 3."
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arises with regard to all rights guaranteed in articles 2-14 of the
Convention.
In addition, such a general framework would also have provided a
suitable opportunity to discuss the possibility of extraditing the appli-
cant to the Federal Republic of Germany. It is indeed surprising that
this alternative was not recognized at all by the majority of the Com-
mission and that the Court mentioned it only as the last of the four
aggravating circumstances for the assessment of the required severity
under article 3 of the Convention. 213 Only the German member in the
Commission, Professor Frowein, dedicated his dissenting opinion to
this question, and was assisted by another dissenting opinion, that of
Professor Trechsel of Switzerland. Their view may be supported for
several reasons.
First, given the two different questions of responsibility at stake for
the British Government, a more general approach to the problem of
responsibility and a more profound discussion of the possibility of ex-
traditing the applicant to the Federal Republic of Germany is justified
and in fact necessary. On one hand, there is an extradition treaty be-
tween the United Kingdom and the United States. If the United
Kingdom does not abide by its obligations deriving from this treaty, it
clearly becomes responsible under public international law, provided
that the United States also fulfils its obligation and "gives assurances
satisfactory to the requesting Party that the death penalty will not be
carried out."'214 Alternatively, if the conditions in the requesting state
involve the serious risk of a violation of one of the rights guaranteed
under the European Convention on Human Rights, "a decision to de-
port, extradite or expel an individual to face such conditions incurs the
responsibility under article 1 of the Convention of the contracting
State which so decides. '215
Second, these contradictory questions of responsibility raise the
general problem of a conflict between treaties. This important issue
requires that there also be a separate and thorough examination of
issues outside the scope of article 3. In the present case, because of the
lack of sufficient assurances by the Commonwealth's Attorney for
213. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 34, para. 110.
214. Extradition Treaty Between the United Kingdom and the United States, supra note 33,
art. 4; cf European Convention on Extradition, art. 11, 359 U.N.T.S. 273, 282 (1960), which
states:
If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the law of the
requesting Party and if in respect of such offence the death-penalty is not provided for by the
law of the requested party or is not normally carried out, extradition may be refused unless
the requesting Party gives such assurance as the requested party considers sufficient that the
death-penalty will not be carried out.
215. Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. 158, 183 (1984).
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Bedford County not to impose or to carry out the death penalty,216
there was no actual conflict between the two treaties. Therefore, the
Strasbourg organs neither had to consult the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties of 1969217 nor did they have to rely on the princi-
ple of jus cogens.218 In fact, it cannot be said that the Court in the
Soering case implicitly affirmed the prevailing of a (regional) human
rights treaty per se over extradition treaties. 219 Only if such a conflict
between different treaties arises will the following questions have to be
answered: (a) whether a human rights treaty always supersedes extra-
dition treaties and (b) whether a death row phenomenon of up to eight
years is prohibited by jus cogens.220
Third, it is also confusing to mix the question of responsibility with
that of the substantive rights guaranteed under the Convention. Since
the scope of these guarantees and their possible limitations are differ-
ent in character and nature, a combination of these two different
problems involves a systematical mistake. Moreover, since article 3 is
of a fundamental and absolute character, a balance of different state
interests cannot be considered "of any importance for the issue under
article 3 whether the applicant could also be extradited to another
216. See European Convention on Extradition, supra note 214.
217. U.N. Doc.A/CONF. 39/27 (1966), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L LAW 875 (1969) andin
25 I.L.M. 543 (1986) (signed at Vienna, May 23, 1969; entered into force January 27, 1980; not
in force for the United States). See id., art. 53:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm
of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international commu-
nity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
Rosenne, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 525 (Bernhardt ed. 1983); I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF TREATIES (2d ed. 1984).
218. Frowein, Jus Cogens, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (R.
Bernhardt ed. 1984); Frowein & Kuhner, Drohende Folterug als Asylgrund und Grenze fur Aus-
lieferung und Ausweisung, 43 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 538 (1983). Gaja, Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention, 172 Recueil des
Cours 271 (1981); L. HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS (1988).
219. For such a conclusion, the wording in para. 87 of the Soering judgment, supra note 5, at
25, is too general.
220. In such a discussion it will then have to be decided whetherjus cogens can be derived
from the (regional) European Convention on Human Rights and whether there is an obligation
erga omnes not to extradite a fugitive to a country where he would face the death row phenome-
non or even the death penalty. See J.A. FROWEIN, DIE VERPFLICHTUNGEN ERGA OMNES IM
VOLKERRECHT UND IHRE DURCHSETZUNG, VOLKERRECHT ALS RECHTSORDNUG, INTERNATI-
ONALE GERICHTSBARKEIT, MENSCHENRECHTE, FESTSCHRIFT FUR H. MOSLER 241 (1983);
Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis of
Three Related Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATES 151-60 (Weiler, Cassese,
Spinedi eds. 1989); T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 173-





Fourth, the Court briefly mentioned the importance of fighting in-
ternational crime in general and the particular role of extradition in
this context. 222 Since this goal of international co-operation and mu-
tual judicial assistance is indeed of paramount value, and could have
been achieved by the possibility of extradition to West Germany, the
fact that Soering would not have gotten away with murder by playing
one nation against another and trying to avoid extradition and convic-
tion 223 should have been weighed and discussed by the Strasbourg or-
gans in a more convincing way.
IV. The Implicit Rejection of Extradition as a Matter
Only Between States
The applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights in
extradition proceedings and the recognition of the responsibility of the
extraditing state, in our opinion, implicitly rule out the traditional the-
ory of extradition law. Under that theory, "extradition is considered a
relationship between the two states concerned, and the person claimed
is considered the object of the dealing between the two states. '224
Generally, such a state-oriented thinking is circumscribed by the term
"treaty-theory," according to which both a general agreement for fu-
ture extraditions and the act of surrender in a particular extradition
case are to be regarded as an international law treaty between the re-
questing and the requested state.
225
221. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 2, para. 8 (H. Danelius, joined by Mr. G. Jorund-
sson and Mr. H. Vandenberghe, dissenting).
222. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Court H.R. (ser. A), at 25, 27, paras 86, 89.
223. As long as there is no international world court in an international (or extraterritorial)
territory that could keep international criminals in the custody of the court, such conflicts of
extradition law cannot be avoided. In the meantime treaties and conventions should include
provisions obligating the States to prosecute the fugitive in cases where surrender is refused.
224. Schultz, The General Framework of Extradition and Asylum, in 2 A TREATISE ON IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 309, 323 (Bassiouni & Nanda eds. 1973). For some historic re-
marks concerning the individual gradually becoming a subject of international law, see
Tornaritis, Individual and Collective Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in 2 A TREA-
TISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 103-55 (Bassiouni & Nanda eds. 1973); Daes, Promo-
tion, Protection and Restoration of Human Rights at the National Regional and International
Level: The Status of the Individual and Contemporary International Law, 40 U.N. ESCOR (Pro-
visional Agenda Item 15(a)), U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub.2/1988/33/Add. 1 (1988); see also
Mosler, Subjects of International Law, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
442 (Bernhardt ed. 1984). For extradition law and its historic evolution, see Stein, Extradition, in
8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 222 (Bernhardt ed. 1985).
225. T. VOGLER, AUSLIEFERUNGSRECHT UND GRUNDGESETZ 28 (1970); K.
SCHWAIGHOFER, supra note 7, at 60 (with further references). Also, the German Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht seems to rely to some extent on this concept, 50 BVERFGE 244, 1979 NEUE JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1285; the reliance is not so clear in 75 BVERFGE 1, 1987 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2155 (see the index of all cases between 1949-1988 in INTERNA-
TIONALE RECHTSHILFE IN STRAFSACHEN (A. Eser & 0. Lagodny eds. 1989). See the correct
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This theory, however, does not provide an answer to two theoreti-
cal questions. First, it does not distinguish between the international
level of an extradition treaty on the one hand and its implementation
and execution by surrender of the fugitive on the municipal level on
the other. 226 Second, because of this exclusion of any recognition or
relevance of municipal law (particularly of constitutional require-
ments), the person extradited has no sufficient legal standing with sub-
stantive and comprehensive procedural rights to oppose extradition in
such state-oriented proceedings. 227 In such a construction of exclusive
or predominating state interests, the requesting and requested states
alone are "subjects" with mutual rights and duties. The person extra-
dited is an "object" and may only be the beneficiary of state-oriented
exceptions or exemptions such as the principle of speciality,228 double
or dual criminality,229 or the political offense clause. 230 It is commonly
criticism of this theory by 0. LAGODNY, supra note 7, at 11, with further references to German
doctrine and practice. Lagodny, Grundrechte als Auslieferungs-Gegenrechte, 1988 NEUE JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2146.
226. The questions on the international level are whether there is an obligation to extradite
and whether human rights orjus cogens and international public order are applicable. The ques-
tion of municipal law is whether the national authorities are allowed under domestic law to
extradite an individual, i.e., whether the requested State is entitled to allow a requesting State to
do what the Constitution of the requested State does not permit. See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (De Meyer, J., concurring).
227. Thus, being a part of international law, such a treaty may only be restricted by interna-
tional law, particularly jus cogens and international public order. Kimminich, Der Schutz pol-
tisch Verfolgter im Auslieferungsverfahren, 12 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZELTSCHRIFT 317,
320 (1986); Vogler, in IRG-KOMMENTAR, at 4, § 8 marginal notes 7-9 (Vogler, Walter &
Wilkitzki); INTERNATIONALER RECHTSHIFEVERKEHR IN STRAFSACHEN IA 2 (Grutzner &
Potz, 2d ed. (1980)). See M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, A DRAFT INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE 129 (1980), who suggests in article IX the following rights of the
individual:
In all proceedings of extradition and other forms of international cooperation, the individual
who is the subject of the said proceedings, shall have the right to appear in person, to oppose
the request or contemplate action of the Contracting Party, to be represented by counsel and
to be heard before an impartial tribunal under fair procedures in conformity with the laws of
the Contracting Party.
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 477 (1986); Bassiouni, The United States Model, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 422
(1987); M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 368
(1974); T. Vogler, The Principle of Speciality in Extradition Law (paper presented at the Interna-
tional Seminar on Extradition, December 4-9, 1989, organized by the International Institute of
Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Siracusa, Italy) (soon to be published). Because of the
insufficient assurance in the Soering case given by the Commonwealth's Attorney for Bedford
County, the points of convergence between the principle of speciality and human rights were
narrowed. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Court H.R. 28-30, paras. 93-99; Commission Report, supra
note 18, at 20-21, paras. 114-21.
229. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 476 (1)(C) (1986); G.N. Herman, S.A. Bernholz & M.J. Bernholz, Double Criminality and
Complex Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE 365-391 (Nanda & Bassiouni eds. 1987); M.E. TIGER, The Extradition Requirement of
Double Criminality in Complex Cases: Illustrating the Rationale of Extradition, paper presented
at the International Seminar on Extradition, December 4-9, 1989, organized by the International
Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences in Siracusa, Italy, soon to be published.
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accepted that these traditional principles were basically aimed at the
protection of the sovereign power of the requested State.23' Individual
interests may be protected at the same time, but only in an indirect
way as a kind of reflex. Only recently has there been a new under-
standing that such exceptions involve rights of the fugitives, which
they can raise even if the requested State did not object to their trial.
232
The Soering case clearly shows that, in extradition proceedings,
such state-oriented interests are not of exclusive relevance. Moreover,
it is a convincing illustration that the fundamental and human rights
of the person extradited must also be considered. The Strasbourg or-
gans considerably strengthened the legal philosophy aiming at the de-
fense, protection, and safeguard of human rights in the field of
extradition by granting the fugitive a legal right of his own.
In this sense, the Soering case diminishes the relevance of the tradi-
tional exceptions and exemptions in extradition law which emerged
and developed in the last century. Making such a logical step towards
modem concepts of the protection of fundamental and human rights
will eventually involve whether the aforementioned traditional princi-
ples of extradition law can be abolished and replaced by only two pro-
visions: an individual-oriented clause for the protection of
fundamental and human rights of the person to be extradited, 233 and a
230. The political-offense exception, which excludes political agitators and dissidents from
extradition, was long regarded as the only centuries-old human rights provision of international
law. This questionable exception can easily be manipulated, so the suspects may be considered
by one state as freedom fighters and by another state as terrorists. See Bassiouni, The Political
Offense Exception in Extradition Law and Practice, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLIT-
ICAL CRIMES 398-447 (Bassiouni ed. 1975); I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 166-93 (1971); Simon, The Political Offense Exception: Recent Changes in Extradition Law
Appertaining to the Northern Ireland Conflict, ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 244-58 (1988); T.
STEIN, DIE AUSLIEFERUNGSAUSNAHME BEI POLITISCHEN DELKTEN (1981) (English summary:
The Political Offence Exception to Extradition) [hereinafter T. STEIN, AUSLIEFERUNGSAUS-
NAHME]; T. Stein, The Political Offense Exception - Developing Trends at the Multinational
Level (paper presented at the International Seminar on Extradition, December 4-9, 1989 in
Siracusa, Italy organized by the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences
(soon to be published); C. VAN DEN WIJNGART, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO Ex-
TRADITION 1-18 (1980).
231. C.L. Blakesley, International Extradition: An Exercise in Comparative and Interna-
tional Law (paper presented at the International Seminar on Extradition) December 4-9, 1989 in
Siracusa, Italy, organized by the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences;
soon to be published; A.H.J. Swart, Defences, Exceptions and Exemptions, A General Survey
(paper presented at the International Seminar on Extradition), December 4-9, 1989, in Siracusa,
Italy, organized by the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (soon to be
published). Also, the classical exceptions that extradition shall not be granted for capital punish-
ment or for offenses punishable with corporal punishment were created because of the same
concern given states to the possibility of a denial of extradition.
232. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 476, 477 (1986).
233. Article IV of the Resolution of the Institute of International Law of September 1, 1983
states:
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state-oriented clause for the preservation of "essential national inter-
ests."' 234 If these two clauses were complemented by a provision oblig-
ing the States to prosecute the fugitive in cases where surrender is
refused, this would also "serve the requirements of international coop-
eration in preventing and suppressing crime as well as the interests of a
fugitive individual. ' 235 The replacement of the traditional exceptions
by these two clauses would have a systematic and a practical advan-
tage. Systematically, these two provisions would take into account the
dual nature and function of extradition law as a combination of public
In cases where there is a well-founded fear of the violation of the fundamental human rights
of an accused in the territory of the requesting State, extradition may be refused, whosoever
the individual whose extradition is requested and whatever the nature of the offence of
which he is accused.
1984 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL LAW 306. See New Problems of
the International Legal System of Extradition With Special Reference to Multilateral Treaties,
1981 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 79 (Provisional and preliminary
reports by Professor Karl Doehring, Draft Resolution and Observations of the members of the
Twelfth Commission); See I. FRANGOU, AUSLIEFERUNGSGRUNDSATZEIM INTERNATIONALEN
UND DEUTSCHEN RECHT 163-219 (Eine Vergleichende Untersuchung der Auslieferungsresolu-
tion des Institut de Droit International und des deutschen Rechts 1989) (with regard to human
rights and article IV of the Resolution).
Cf Draft Model Treaty on Extradition of 23 October 1989, U.N. Doc. E/AC.57/1990 (1990),
where article 3 provides inter alia the following mandatory grounds for refusal: ". . .(b) If the
Requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition has been
made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race,
religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinions, sex or status, or that the person's position
may be prejudiced for any of those reasons; ... (f) If the person whose extradition is requested
would be subjected in the Requesting State to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment or if he would not be entitled to the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings,
as contained in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." Regretta-
bly, this Draft Model Treaty on Extradition neither mentions in its introduction and preamble
the need to respect human dignity and the constitutional rights of the individual in a sufficient
way nor makes the provision of this Treaty Model any distinctions between international human
rights and municipal (constitutional) rights.
Compare in this context the extradition treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and
Yugoslavia of November 26, 1970, which states in article 6, § I as follows: "The requested State
shall not extradite persons whose extradition it does not consider permissible under its Constitu-
tion." 994 U.N.T.S. 95, 116 (1976).
According to article 1 of the Recommendation No. R (80) 9 of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, adopted on June 27, 1980, extradition shall not be granted "where a request
for extradition emanates from a state not party to the European Convention on Human Rights
and where there are substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the
purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person concerned on account of his race, religion, na-
tionality or political opinion, or that his position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons."
Council of Europe, Collection of Recommendations, Resolutions and Declarations of the Com-
mittee of Ministers Concerning Human Rights, 1949-87, at 83 (1989).
234. Because of the "politically motivated unwillingness of States to become involved in
some other State's (political) problems," Professor Stein suggests this additional exception to the
humanitarian clause: "Extradition may be refused if the requested State declares that the surren-
der of the fugitive would be contrary to essential national interests." T. STEIN, AUSLIEFURUNGS-
AUSNAHME, supra note 230, at 380, 381. In his opinion, "[r]esort to this clause would amount to
suspending the extradition treaty with respect to a specific request, and would therefore be re-
served for exceptional circumstances."
235. Id. at 381.
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international law236 and municipal (constitutional) law. 237 The practi-
cal effects would be that, because of the abolition of the various tradi-
tional exceptions, extradition proceedings will become much easier
and, therefore, faster and more effective. Thus, strengthening the safe-
guards of human rights in virtually every case would make sophisti-
cated and complex extradition law considerably less complicated.
V. All Convention Rights as Obstacles to Extradition
Due to the lack of separation of the question of responsibility
under article 1 of the Convention from the examination of the substan-
tive guarantee of article 3, a misunderstanding may arise that not all
rights contained in the Convention could be obstacles to extradi-
tion.238 Indeed, the Court states:
Article 1 cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the effect
that, notwithstanding its extradition obligations, a Contracting State
may not surrender an individual unless satisfied that conditions awaiting
him in the country of destination are in full accord with each of the
safeguards of the Convention. 239
Again, several arguments can be made to show that this statement
does not rule out the possibility that all Convention rights can be ob-
stacles to extradition.
First, this statement cannot be read alone and without references
to another statement two sentences later in the same paragraph.
There, the Court continues:
These considerations cannot, however, absolve the Contracting Parties
from responsibility under Article 3 for all and any foreseeable conse-
quences of extradition suffered outside their jurisdiction.24°
Second, the first statement must be juxtaposed to some cautious re-
marks by the Court on the territorial limitation of the Convention in
general. Reading these remarks, which advise against an extraterrito-
rial application of the Convention in third States, one gets the impres-
sion that the Court wanted to create with its first statement a kind of a
"placebo," or reassurance, before giving its far-reaching judgment.
Third, in the next paragraph, the Court remembers the evolutive
and effective character of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Holding that its special character as a treaty for the collective enforce-
236. With regard to the interrelation between the requesting and requested states as well as
to the minimal standards of human rights, ite. jus cogens and international public order.
237. With regard to the interference with constitutional rights of the person extradited by
coercive extradition measures.
238. C. VAN DENN WYNGAERT, supra note 6, at 6.
239. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Court H.R. (ser. A), at 25, para. 86 (1989).
240. Id. at 26, para. 86 (emphasis added).
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ment of human rights and fundamental freedoms requires "that its
provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards prac-
tical and effective,"'12 4 the Court implicitly says that all provisions and
safeguards of the Convention may be obstacles to extradition. More-
over, the Court did not expressly say that only article 3 may be such
an obstacle.
242
Fourth, accepting the view that every coercive measure in an ex-
tradition process is per se an interference with fundamental rights
guaranteed in the constitution of the requested State means that every
such right may bar extradition if there is no justification for such a
measure or if the principle of proportionality is not respected. Also,
this reasoning leads to the conclusion that the minimum standards of
the Convention rights can be independent obstacles to extradition even
if they are not explicitly mentioned in the applicable extradition treaty
or statute.
Fifth, this view is further supported by the Court's remarks con-
cerning article 6. Whereas the Commission denied any responsibility
of the British Government for "a matter entirely within the responsi-
bility of the United States of America, ' 243 the Court did "not exclude
that an issue might exceptionally be raised under article 6 by an extra-
dition decision in circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or
risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting coun-
try."' 244 Since the predominant doctrine and practice do not consider
extradition proceedings as a criminal trial, but as an act of mutual
judicial assistance,245 this non-exclusion of article 6 in the Soering case
can only be understood to say that every coercive measure in extradi-
tion proceedings is an interference by the extraditing State with funda-
mental human rights which must be both justified and proportional.
Finally, this conclusion may be confirmed by the jurisprudence of
the Strasbourg organs itself. Whereas, in the Soering case, the Com-
mission held that there was a violation of article 13, the Court based
241. Id. at para. 87 (emphasis added).
242. The references to its case law indicate to the contrary: besides Ireland v. The United
Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 90 (1978), the Court also cited the Artico Case, 37 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 16 (1980), and the Case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 27 (1976). Cf supra note 208.
243. Commission Report, supra note 18, at 28, para. 156.
244. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 36, para. 113. See Professor Trechsel's
dissenting opinion in the Commission Report, supra note 18, where he states that "[i]f the re-
quested State knowingly concurs in unfair proceedings, it also bears some responsibility for the
violation of human rights of the person concerned."
245. See. the definition by Tenth Congress of International Criminal Law, reported by
Schultz, Aktuelle Probleme der Ausieferung, in 81 ZETSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHT-
SWISSENSCHAFT 199, 202 (1969).
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its decision on article 3. Therefore, it was not necessary for it to ex-
press an opinion on the other rights claimed by the applicant.
D. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
De lege lata the Strasbourg organs could not say that the death
penalty itself would violate the applicant's right to life. Soering himself
did not claim such an interpretation, nor does such an understanding
exist today in all Western European States. Article 2, section 1 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, as well as the lack of an
opinio juris sive necessitatis, still advise against such an approach.
These two reasons will, however, diminish and lose their weight.
Thus, an increasing number of countries have abolished capital pun-
ishment de jure or de facto 246 and grant extradition only after having
received explicit assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed
or carried out. In his concurring opinion, Judge De Meyer outlined
the probable direction of an evolutive Strasbourg jurisprudence. 247
Indeed, two smoke signals have already passed in the air. First,
Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights Con-
cerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty is the first instrument in
international law obligating the signatories to abolish this punishment
in peacetime 248 and to recognize the subjective right of the individual
to be neither condemned to death nor executed. The Sixth Protocol
was adopted on April 28, 1983 and has been ratified by fourteen States
of the Council of Europe.
249
Second, besides this growing movement towards the abolition of
the death penalty among the European states, the United Nations also
opened for signature and ratification a new human rights instrument
aimed at the abolition of capital punishment. On December 15, 1989,
the General Assembly adopted this new instrument, which is con-
tained in a Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, by a recorded vote of fifty-nine in favour to
246. In fact, none of the member states of the Council of Europe carries out the death pen-
alty. See the citation of the written comments of Amnesty International by the Court, according
to which there is a "virtual consensus in Western European legal systems that the death penalty
is, under current circumstances, no longer consistent with regional standards of justice." Soering
Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 31, para. 102.
247. See Blumenwitz, 16 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFr 326-28 (1989); Suder,
supra note 188, at 115.
248. Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights Concerning the Aboli-
tion of the Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114, allows derogations from its prohi-
bition of the death penalty only in time of war or of imminent threat of war. Article 1 of the
Protocol stipulates: "The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such
penalty or executed."
249. Europ. T.S. No. 114, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications (Jan. 9, 1989).
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twenty-six against, with forty-eight abstentions. 250 The Special Rap-
porteur produced exhaustive comparative analysis together with a
draft optional protocol in his comprehensive and well-documented re-
port. He stated that the implementation of an international instru-
ment devoted specifically to the abolition of the death penalty follows
logically from the "right to life" contained in article 6 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.251
Looking at these new trends, as well as the jurisprudence of the
Commission in extradition cases since the early 1960s, 252 it cannot be
said that the verdict in the Soering case "comes from a most perverse
reading of the Convention which the Court interprets" or that "this
judgment lacks all common sense. ' 253
250. United Nations Database of December 15, 1989; U.N. Press Release GA/7977, Jan. 22,
1990; U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/128 (1990).
251. Bossuyt, Elaboration of a second optional prtocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/
1987/20 (1987). Cf. Report of the Secretary-General containing views expressed by Governments
pursuant to Commission and Human Rights Resolution 1989/25 of March 6, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/
44/592 (1989).
252. Its practice since that time shows that "the deportation of a foreigner to a particular
country might in exceptional circumstances give rise to the question whether there had been
'inhuman treatment' within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention," and that "similar con-
siderations might apply to cases where a person is extradited to a particular country in which,
due to the very nature of the rigime of that country or to a particular situation in that country,
basic human rights, such as are guaranteed by the Convention, might be either grossly violated or
entirely suppressed"; No. 1802/63, X v. the Federal Republic of Germany, 10 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. 26, 36 (1963); No. 4763/71, X v. Belgium, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 157 (1971); No. 10308/
83, Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 209, 236 (1983); No. 10,479/
83 Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 158 (1984); No. 15658/89 Mansi v.
Sweden, - Eur. Comm'n H.R. - (1989), Press Communique of the Council of Europe C (89)
151 (Expulsion to Jordan notwithstanding the indication of the President of the Commission not
to expell the applicant before a further examination of the application was in breach of article 3);
Frowein & Peukert, supra note 198, art. 3; Rosenmayr, Article 3 MRK, in 19 DIE EUROPAISCHE
MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTION 139 (Ermacora, Nowak, Tretter eds. 1983); G.E. Wilms, The
Recent Case Law on Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms - With Special Regard to Definition Problems and State Obligations (1988) (unpub-
lished master's thesis). With regard to Article 4, see No. 4314/69, X v. the Federal Republic of
Germany, 32 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 96 (1970) (an expulsion to a country where a duty to military
service exists is not inhuman); No. 7334/76, X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 5 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. 154 (1976) (a criminal prosecution for desertion from the army is not an inhuman treat-
ment and, therefore, an expulsion to such a country not a violation of Article 3). With regard to
article 5, see Sanchez Reisse Case, 107 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986) (provisional arrest in extra-
dition proceedings is a serious infringement upon personal liberty), and Bozano Case, 121 and
153 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (disguised extradition is a violation of Article 5); cf. Berger, supra note
188 at 334-36, 347-51.
253. A Courtroom Phenomenon, The Times (London), July 8, 1989, at 11, col. 1. The same
commentary ends with the following and also not quite accurate, cf. note 250, observation: "It is
also entirely out of character with the previous, generally cautious interpretations of Article 3
which have been handed down over the years".
